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EVOLUTION EQUATIONS OF C 3 I:
CANNONICAL FORMS AND THEIR PROPERTIES
Paul H. Moose
In this paper, five different two-species non-
linear evolution equations are described that
represent, (a) mixed attrition Lanchester combat
with resupply and (b) four different models of
information war. Their dynamical properties are
analyzed and it is shown that four of the five are
environmentally unstable. The meaning of this is
interpreted for C^l , counter-C 3
,
and intel-
ligence operations. For the environmentally un-
stable systems it is shown that the relationships
between the parameters in the model are critical in
establishing their mode of behavior, whereas in-
itial conditions are critical in determining the
actual trajectories of evolution.
In several earlier papers, we have suggested the use of non-linear evolu-
tion equations to model the dynamics of the average information of each of two
opposing sides engaged in conflict. Moose, [1980], developed the properties of
one particular version of a model for counter-C 3 ; counter-C 3 refers to "de-
liberate acts to distort or deny information or to confuse or deceive one's op-
position." In that paper several alternative counter-C 3 models, as well as a
model for intelligence activities, were suggested.
In a subsequent paper, Moose, [1983], developed a four-species model to
account for interactions between the combat forces and the information on each
side. Some of the most general properties of that model exposed the fact that,
unlike the earlier counter-C^ model, a four-species model is environmentally
unstable. That is, for some ranges of the parameters of the model, the system
is unstable, whereas for others it is stable. By contrast, an environmentally
stable model is stable for all values of its parameters. (Passive electrical
and mechanical networks are familiar forms of environmentally stable systems,
whereas automatic control systems are environmentally unstable systems.)
Evolution equations have been used to model phenomena in the social
sciences before. Lanchester, [1916], initiated the use of coupled first-order
differential equations to model the attrition of military forces engaged in
combat. Richarson, [1960] attempted to fit the growth of military arms in
"arms races" to linear evolution models. In a recent survey article,
Intril igator, [1982], cited eleven examples of the use of differential equa-
tions and systems of differential equations to account for various political
phenomena related to conflict resolution.
Non-linear evolution equations are particularly interesting because they
have more than one stationary point. This enables us to duplicate mathemati-
cally the unusual behavior of many complex phenomena that seem to be attracted
for a period of time toward a particular condition, then in an apparently arbi-
trary and unpredictable way change to another characteristic condition. This
branch of mathematics is now referred to as chaos theory and the characteristic
types of system behavior are called "strange attractors."
In this paper, we shall study the properties of five different two-species
systems. One of these is a Lanchester type combat force attrition model with a
mixture of area and directed fire; the relative mix will be made dependent on
parameters which we presume are related to the "goodness" of the C3j system
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of each side. In addition we shall study three counter-C^ models, including
the model of Moose, [1980]. These models are intended to capture the essence
of "information war." The fifth model was suggested by Moose [1980] to de-
scribe the struggle between two sides for "intelligence information." These
five models are shown to be of three cannonical types. The stationary points
and stability of each type are derived. Types "one" and "three" are environ-
mentally unstable and, as shown by example, are ^ery rich in the nature of
their behavior. Type "two" is environmentally stable.
The Equations and Their Interpretation
Coupled two-species evolution equations are of the general form
(1)








and Fy are attrition functions. They depend on the state variables
X and Y and on a set of parameters y. Vx and Vy are replenishment terms.
They, as well as the u may be constants or time dependent. If the parameters
and replenishments are constants, the system is said to be autonomous. We
shall consider only autonomous systems.
Mixed attrition of combat forces is characterized by;
1) A rate of loss due to directed fire which is proportional to the size
of the opposition's force.
2) A rate of loss due to area fire which depends on the size of the op-
position's force and of the density of one's own force.
3) A natural rate of loss due to accident, illness, disertion, etc.
4) Reinforcement and resupply of the combat force in the field.
In order to account for these conditions, let
X = -b X - a y Y - a (1 - y )XY + V





Y = -b Y - a y X - a (1 - u )XY + V
y xx x v M x' y
(2)
be the specific characterization of (1). The parameters b x and by are the
natural loss rates, ay and a
x
are related to the rates of fire and prob-
ability of kill of the weapons systems in use, and yy and y x describe the
fraction, of Y_'s and Vs forces respectively, that are aimed or directed fire.
If a y is zero, then all the fire is area fire. If a y is one, then all the
fire is aimed. The V x and Vy are the average rates of reinforcement and
resupply of X. and Y_.
We shall be interested in analyzing the behavior of (2) in the two-dimen-
sional parameter space u x , \iy • There are two interpretations we can make
for the y's. In terms of C-^I, we argue that y's monotonically increases to-
ward one as the C^I is improved, i.e., better C^I improves targeting on the
average and hence the fire tends more toward aimed fire and less toward area
fire. Another interpretation is that of an exposed force attacking a concealed
defender. Suppose X_ is attacking and Y_ is defending. Since _X exposes his po-
sition during attack, Y_ may aim his fire and \iy tends to one. fin the other
hand, _X must fire into Vs defended area, not knowing exactly where Y_ is, so
u x
tends toward zero. This is similar to a case studied by Brackney, [1959].
In an information war, the state variables X and Y represent the average
information each side possesses about the combat environment. We are inter-
preting information here in its theoretical sense as lack of uncertainty.
There are many microscopic informational entities that make up the state of the
combat environment. These include your own and the enemies force locations,
capabilities and even his intentions. The true state of the environment is
never known exactly and moreover, without continuing intelligence and combat
reports to update or replenish the information, it will decay over time due to
the dynamic nature of the environment.
Each information war model will contain
1) A natural rate of loss due to the dynamic properties of the environ-
ment.
2) Replenishment of information from intelligence, sensor, combat and
other reports.
3) A rate of loss due to deliberate acts of the opposition to deceive,
confuse, jam, etc. This is the counter-C^ term and it is in this





































In all three models b
x
and by represent natural loss rates and V x
and Vy represent replenishment rates for X_ and Y_ respectively.
The assumption in (3a) is that counter-C,3 effectiveness of _Y against X.
depends on the product of Y_'s knowledge (Y) and X_'s ignorance (X - X).
(X is the maximum possible level of information of L) The premise is that
counter-c3 is more effective against an already confused or ignorant enemy
than against an intelligent one. Furthermore, that one is more effective in
devising counter-c3 the better informed he is about the environment. py
and p x are parameters.
In (3b), the assumption is that the enemies' lack of knowledge is imma-
terial in matters of counter-c3. Its effectiveness only depends on one's own
knowledge of the environment. ay and ax are parameters, here assumed to be
positive. We note in passing that for negative values of a x and ay, (3b)
are Richarson's, [1960] linear equations for arms races.
In (3c) the assumption is that an ignorant or already confused enemy can-
not be further confused by counter-C^ acts, but that in fact, the effective-
ness of such tactics actually increases with his as well as one's own accurate
state of knowledge about the environment. uy and u x are parameters, pre-
sumed to be positive but possibly greater than one. Eq.'s (3c) were those
analyzed for equilibria and stability in the paper by Moose, [1980] and found
to be environmentally stable.
The final model we wish to consider is in the area of intelligence infor-
mation acquisition. Like the other information models X and Y represent the
average values of correct information about an uncooperative environment. The
properties to be modeled are:
1) A natural rate of information loss due to the dynamic environment.
2) Replenishment of information through normal open intelligence gath-
ering channels.
3) Information growth through uncooperative channels that "leak" more
information about the enemy in proportion to his ignorance and are
better "exploited" by one's own assets in proportion to one's own
knowledge. The latter is to account for more effective targeting of
limited acquisition resources.
X = -b X + v (Y - Y)X + V
X X
v X





Eq.'s (4) are the intelligence information evolution equations that ac-
count for these proposed properties. yx and uy are parameters. They are
presumed to be positive but we could imagine that they are negative if the
"leaks" are in fact "misinformation" being used for the purpose of deception.
In summary, the five systems of equations represent models of;
Eq. (2) : Mixed attrition combat,
Eq. (3a) : Information war; counter-C^ depends on one's own know-
ledge and opposition's ignorance,
Eq. (3b) : Information war; counter-C^ depends on one's own know-
ledge,
Eq. (3c) : Information war; counter-C~ depends on the product of
one's own knowledge and opposition's knowledge,
Eq. (4) : Intelligence information; intelligence grows in proportion
to enemy ignorance and one's own knowledge.
Cannonical Forms
Eq.'s (2), (3a) and (3b) are of a cannonical form we shall call "Type 1"














Y = -b Y - a v X - a (1 - u )XY + V
y xx x v x' y
The parameters b
x
and by are positive and have the interpretations of nat-
ural loss rates. Eqs. (2) are obtained from (5) by restricting ax and ay
to be positive and u x and \iy to be greater than or equal to zero and less
than or equal to one. Eq. (3b) is obtained from (5) by setting y x and uy












a = p (X - 1) , a = p (Y - 1)
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Since, as we shall explain shortly, X and Y are restricted to being
greater than one, uy and u x will be greater than one and ay and ax will
be positive in this transformation.
In summary, Eq. (5) in a cannonical form for Eq. (2), the mixed attrition
model , Eq. (3a) the counter-C^ model depending on the enemies' ignorance for
deceptive successes, and Eq. (3b), the counter-C J model that is independent
of the enemies' state of knowledge. The range of the parameter pair u x , vy
determines the model to which (5) applies. Between zero and one, we have the
mixed attrition model. For values greater than or equal to one we have two of
the counter-C^ models.
Eqs. (3c) are of a unique form which we shall designate "Type 2" equa-
tions. Again, we shall investigate their properties in the two-dimensional
parameter space y x , \iy . Eqs. (4), the intelligence equations are also
different and we shall designate them as "Type 3" equations.
Stationary Points
In general, two-species, quadratic evolution equations may have four sta-
tionary points, that is points in the X-Y plane for which X and Y are simulta-
neously zero. However, because there are no X^ or Y^ terms these equations
all have two stationary, or equil ibrium, points. In all of these models, the
state variables, X and Y only have intelligent interpretation when they are
non-negative. Furthermore, the purpose of the replenishment terms is to make
up for attrition in order to maintain their values at a desired level. We
shall thus presume V
x
and Vy are picked to establish one of the equilibrium
points in the positive quadrant of the state space. It is mathematically con-
venient to pick this point as W e i, Ye i \ = \ 1,1 j, by suitable scale
changes if necessary. Hereafter we shall refer to this as the unity equilibri-
um point. This prescribes a fixed relationship between the model parameters
and the replenishment terms. Namely;
Type 1 :
V = b + a
x x y













V = b - y (Y - 1)
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It is easily seen that (7), (3) and (9) substituted into (5), (3c) and (4)
along with X = Y = 1 make X and Y simultaneously zero for the Type 1, Type 2
and Type 3 equations respectively. Given that unity is an equilibrium point,
one may find the other equilibrium point by direct algebraic manipulation. Let
it be designated sX e2, Y e2?. Then
Type 1 -
'
e2 ~ y 1 - V " (bx /ay )(i " ^
(b /a )(b /a + 1) - y (b /a + 1)
'
x y y x ' Vjcj '
e2 u (1 - U Y ) - (b /«)(! - u)
(10)





































give the locations of the second stationary point for each of the three can-
nonical forms in terms of the model parameters.
We can make some general observations about the locus of these points.
For Type 1 systems, the second equilibrium point may lie in any quadrant of the
state space. However, if either u x or uy is greater than one, it cannot be
in the third quadrant, i.e., X e2 and Y e2 cannot both be negative. And
for u x > 1 + by/ax ancl Uy y 1 + bx /ay, it must lie in the first
quadrant, i.e., both X
e2 and Y e2 will be positive.
For (3a), the first counter-C^ model, this requirement corresponds to
p x > by and py > bx according to the transformation required by (6).
We may in fact use (6) to define the second equilibrium point of Type 1 equa-
tions directly in terms of I X , Y
, p x , py
J"
, the counter-C^ parame-
ters of (3a), by the equivalent form.
Type 1 (alternate form) :
X (Y
rt
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small p x and py, the equilibrium point moves toward plus infinity until at
zero the equations are linear for which there is just one equilibrium point,
unity. In between ranges of p x and p» can move the equilibrium point into
any quadrant with the behavior quite remarkable near the singular points.
For example, as py -> b x , Xe 2 -* -« but Y 92 -* Y and vice ver-
sa. However, if py -» b x and p x -+ by simul taneoul sy, then Xe 2 ' *
and Y e2 -* Y . It is for values of p x and py near these singular
points that we find j X e2, Ye2 \ outside of the first quadrant.
In (10), the original form, for p x and \iy much less than one, a likely
range for (2) the mixed attrition Lanchester equations, the second equilibrium
point will lie in the fourth quadrant, and be infeasible. For u x = py
= 1,
the case of (3b), the equations are linear and there is only one equilibrium
point, unity. The locus of jX e2, Ye2 ( is shown in Figure 1 for several
values of the model parameters, that might correspond to (2) and in Figure 2
for ranges that might correspond to (3a). It is worth mentioning here that
X and Y are the maximum possible levels of information X and Y can pos-
sibly possess. If unity is to be an equilibrium point that is feasible, then
X and Y must be greater than one, a condition we have previously
assumed.
For Type 2 systems, X
e2 and Y e£ are always negative. Thus, only
one equilibrium point is in the accessible region of the state space. The neg-
ative point is not feasible since X and Y cannot be negative quantities. Type
2 equations correspond to the counter-C^ model of (3c) which postulates
counter-C^ dependent on the product of Vs and Y_'s knowledge. This was the
model analyzed by Moose, [1980] where the same condition was described.
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The second equilibrium point for Type 3 system lies in the third quadrant
providing V
x
and Vy, the constant rates for replacing lost intelligence in-
formation, are positive. Even if V x and Vy are zero; Jxe2, Y e2 [ =
Jo,
oj.
To summarize: When their first equilibrium point is placed at unity, in
the first quadrant of the state space, the second equilibrium point for Type 2
and Type 3 systems is strictly negative, i.e., in the third quadrant of the
state space. The second equil ibrium point of Type 1 systems may be in any
quadrant. However, for sufficiently large values of y x and uy» or p x and
py, it must be in the first quadrant. Only the first quadrant of the state
space is considered a feasible region for the state variables.
Stabil ity
The parameters of evolution equations determine their stability near
equilibrium points as well as the location of the equilibrium points. Stabil-
ity near an equilibrium point, called neighborhood stability, refers to the
dynamic property of the system to return to or diverge from equilibrium if per-
turbed from the equilibrium position.
In order to investigate this, we replace the state variables according to
A
x e
Y = 8 + Y
y e
and expand (1) about |xp , Y (in
13)
a Taylor series. Retaining only the first
order terms in the expansion, which is valid for small 8 X and 8y, one ob-
















and each of the partial derivations are to be evaluated at the equilibrium
point under investigation. [See Moose, [1983] or May, [1974] for a more com-
plete description of the perturbation method for this class of non-linear evo-
lution equations.]
The conflict matrix determines the stability or instability of the system.
If all its eigenvalues are in the left half plane, the system is "stable";
i.e., perturbations will die out. If one or both of its eigenvalues are in the
right half plane, a minor perturbation will grow and the system will diverge
from that equilibrium. In this case it is said to be "unstable." If its ei-
genvalues are complex, (they must be complex conjugates if they are), the sys-
tem dynamics will be oscillating. The oscillations will die out if it is sta-
ble, but will grow if it is unstable. If the eigenvalues are in the left half
plane for all possible values of the parameters, the system is said to be "en-
vironmentally stable." If for some values of the parameters, the system is
stable but for others it is unstable, the system is said to "environmentally
unstabl e.
"
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Type 1 (alternate form)
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-b + u (X - X )
y V o e y
(18
Equations (16) through (18) show how the conflict matrix and hence system
stability depends on the parameters of each of the cannonical types. Recall
that {x e i> Y e i J" = <1, 1 }• is an equilibrium point located in the feasi-
ble region of the state space. In order to obtain the conflict matrices near
this point, we simply put X e = Y e = 1 in (16) through (18), and investigate
the properties of the eigenvalues. However, I X e £, Y e2 [ is also an
equilibrium point and we must substitute the appropriate equations from the
previous section into (16) through (18) in order to determine stability there.
If equilibrium point two as well as the unity equilibrium is in the feasi-
ble region, as is frequently the case in Type 1 systems, then there is the pos-
sibility of two feasible stable steady states. Or one or the other may be sta-
ble and the other unstable, in which case the system will seek the stable solu-
tion. For Type 2 and 3 systems, the stability of the unity point is most
16
important because the other point is not feasible. However, if the unity point
is unstable, and the unfeasible point is stable, then we can forecast that botn
the state variables will die out, that is, tend toward negative values, instead
of growing without bound.
The eigenvalues of Ce are the roots of the characteristic polynomial
D(p) = p - (Cu + C 22 )p + (Cn C22 - C 12 C 21 )
where the coefficients are the elements of Cp .

















are functions of the system parameters according to (16) through (13). We note
that if
and











e [p]_] and R e [p2] are less than zero, i.e., pi and p2 are in
the left half plane, and the system is stable. Eq. (21), which is called the
Routh Test [see, e.g., Truxall, [1972]] is a necessary and sufficient condition
for stability. We also note from (20) that C]_? C^i > is a sufficient
condition for both of the roots to be real
.
Stability of Type 1 Systems at Unity Equilibrium












+ 1)] > 1. (22)
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Eq. (22) is the second condition of (21), since the first is always satisfied.
The stable and unstable regions determined by (22) are illustrated in Figure 3.
Note that when natural loss rates are equal to or greater than the external at-
trition coefficients, b x /ay > 1 and by/ax > 1, the system is stable for
all positive values of u x and uy less than one. On the other hand, if
b
x/oy and by/ax become yery small, then the unity equilibrium point is
unstable for all values of y x greater than b x/ay and uy greater than
by/a
x
. In Figures 3a, 3b and 3c, we have sketched the left side of (22)
for three specific values of b
x
/oty and by/ax in order to illustrate
this point graphically.
The quantities b/a are related to the efficiency of warfare. When warfare
is \/ery efficient b/a is small for both sides and war is fundamentally unstable
at its unity equilibrium point; that is, the force levels cannot stay at their
planned military levels. What happens with larger values for y, corresponding
to greater C-3 efficiency is that it is unstable for relatively larger values
of b/a corresponding to lower levels of warfare efficiency.
Since the combat force levels cannot remain at their planned levels, when
the system is unstable, we must ask, what will the system trajectory be? This
brings the stability properties of the second equilibrium point into play.
Because X
e2, Y e 2, which depend on the system parameters, appear explic-
itly in the conflict matrix, its eigenvalues are much more complicated func-
tions of the parameters than the eigenvalues at unity equilibrium. A discus-
sion of these properties will be deferred to a separate paper.
For u x and uy greater than one, Type 1 equations represent the
counter-C^ model of information war of (3a) and we can determine the
13
conditions from (16a) and (21) for stability to be
and




It is easy to show that the second condition implies the first so that the
second condition is both necessary and sufficient for the system to be stable.
As shown in Figures 4a and 4b, this occurs for values of p x less than by
and py less than b x . As with the Lanchester model of mixed attrition, this
information war model becomes unstable at unity equilibrium when the counter-
ed effectiveness )p x , py( exceeds the natural loss rates, jb x , by>.
Examples of stable and unstable phase trajectories are shown in Figures
5a, 5b, 5c and 5d for Type 1 systems. Type 1 systems are environmentally
unstable systems as defined earlier.
Finally, we note that
C10 C 91 = a a = p p w (Xn - l)(Y rt - 1) > (24)12 21 x y x y^ o /v o ' '
for Type 1 systems at unity equilibrium. Therefore the eigenvalues are real
numbers and the trajectories are non-oscillating near there.
Stability of Type 1 Systems for u = u = 1
* 1
This is the case for counter-C^ equations (3b) or, if we permit a
x
and








so that the system is stable when
£ . £ < 1 (26,
y x
i.e., when the warfare efficiencies are relatively low. When efficiencies
become too great, the system becomes unstable and diverges toward whichever
side gains the initial advantage. There is no second equilibrium point. The
regions defined by (26) are shown in Figure 6 for the la.x , ay 1 parameter
space.
Stability of Type 2 Systems
When we apply the Routh Test, (21), to the conflict matrix for Type 2 sys-
tems, (17), at unity equilibrium, we find that the system is environmentally
stable at unity equilibrium since
-(b +b +m +p)<0





x x y y
for all possible values of the parameters.
At equilibrium point two, which is always in the third quadrant, we find,
with the aid of (11) that it is always unstable since
C,, + C 00 = v b /b + y b /b > (28)11 22 x x y y y x












so the solutions of the linear state equations are non-oscillatory.
To summarize; Type 2 systems, the counter-C^ model (3c) and the model
studied by Moose, [1980] for counter-C 3
,
are environmentally stable at unity
equilibrium, and non-oscillatory. Their other equilibrium point which is in
the third quadrant and is therefore unfeasible, is always unstable. Thus, we
20
may anticipate Type 2 systems to always tend back toward unity equilibrium,
even from quite far away. In fact, they are probably globally stable at
unity.
Stability of Type 3 Systems at Unity Equilibrium
At unity equilibrium, Type 3 systems are stable if
u (Y - 1) + u (X - 1) < b + bM
x
v
o y o ' x y
and




- (X - 1)
(30)
< 1
Eq. (30) is quite similar to (23), the stability conditions at unity for
Type la systems, but the second inequality is reversed. Figure 7 illustrates
how the conditions of (30) generate a region of stability which is a diagonal
strip in the |u x > ^y f parameter space. For either too small or too large
values of p x and yy, the system is unstable.
We know that the second equilibrium point of Type 3 systems always lies in
the third quadrant and is therefore not feasible. It, like unity equilibrium,
is environmentally unstable. Its properties will also be described more fully
in a subsequent report. However, we note here that
C, C , =u u X Y >012 21 x y e e '31)
holds for both points so that Type 3, like Type 2 systems, are non-oscillatory.
A summary of the principal system properties for each of the five models
is presented below in Table 1.
21
















E.U. E.U. E.U. S. E.U.
2) Equil ibrium Point
Two Locus
I, II, III, IV I, II, III, IV n/a Ill Ill
3) Equil ibrium Point
Two Stab il ity




(Equl ibm 2) (Egul ibm 2)
no no no
Table 1
Summary of Principal System Properties
(E.U. = Environmentally Unstable, U = Always
Unstable, S = Always Stable, State Space Quad-
rants I, II, III, IV.)
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Discussion
The five models we have investigated in this paper are all generalized
Lotka-Vol terra equations for two-species systems. In spite of these restric-
tions, their interpretation in the C^I context seems meaningful and the na-
ture of their dynamic behavior quite remarkable.
The mixed attrition Lanchester type model with constant replenishment is
quite useful to evaluate the increased effectiveness of forces as they become
more precisely targeted against the enemies' forces. The interpretaton of the
parameter uy for side Y can be: %y increases from zero toward one as Y's
targeting accuracy improves with better C^l," or "uy decreases toward zero
as counter-C-^ techniques by X confuse or decoy Y's aimed fire" or "uy is
large if X, in order to attack, must expose his positions to Y who has accurate
targetable weapons." (For example, mines are not targetable weapons but laser-
aimed anti-tank missiles are.) All three of these interpretations for the u
parameter in the mixed attrition model are C^i or counter-C^ related. We
also note that increasing y tends to make the system unstable. One would sus-
pect that the side with the greatest \i should win when instability occurs. Al-
though this may happen, it is not guaranteed and in fact what does transpire
depends critically on the location and stability of the second equilibrium
point and on the initial conditions at the onset of the conflict. We will in-
vestigate this phenomenon in more detail in a separate report.
The three different models for information war involving counter-C^
measures show the critical importance of our assumptions about how the counter-
ed techniques actually effect the opposition's efforts to keep his informa-
tion current and accurate. If, as was assumed in the previous paper [Moose,
[1980]], these activities are effective against a well informed enemy, but
23
ineffective against an ignorant, or already confused one, then the dynamics are
those of the Type 2 systems. These dynamics are remarkably simple and essen-
tially independent of the actual values of the model parameters insofar as the
gross system behavior is concerned. On the other hand, if counter-C^ methods
are in fact more effective against an enemy as he becomes more confused or ig-
norant, such as might occur through input overloading of his sensors and proc-
essing equipments, then the dynamics are those of Type la systems. These dy-
namics have two major modes, stable and unstable, and the mode of behavior is
critically dependent on the actual model parameters.
Finally, in our intelligence information model, the behavior corresponds
to Type 3 systems. Here again there are two modes of behavior but only one
possible stable point in the feasible region. Therefore, either both sides are
maintained with a fairly constant level of knowledge about the other or one
side tends to know a great deal while the other knows very little. The first
mode prevails when intelligence comes primarily from analysis of non-restricted
or uncontrollable sources of information about the enemy. The second condition
prevails when intelligence comes more predominately from breaks in the enemy's
security; through espionage, communication intercepts, etc. This model too
needs further examination as the stability of its second equilibrium point,
which is in the third (non-feasible) quadrant, still has a great influence of
the actual trajectory of this type of information war.
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FIGURE 3c
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FIGURE 4a
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